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This paper argues for a hybrid and alternative theory of names—Socio-
historical Causal Descriptivism, which consists of six claims: (1) the re-
ferring relation between a name and an object originates from a general-
ized “initial baptism” of that object. (2) The causal chain of the name N 
fi rstly and mainly transmits informative descriptions of N’s bearer. (3) 
The meaning of N consists of an open-ended collection of informative 
descriptions of N’s bearer acknowledged by a linguistic community. (4) 
With respect to practical needs of agents there is s weighted order in the 
collection of descriptions of N’s bearer. (5) The meaning or even partial 
meaning of N, together with the background of a discourse, the network 
of knowledge, speaker’s intention, etc., determines the referent of N. (6) 
All names have their own referents, including physical individuals, and 
parasitic, fi ctional, or intensional objects; there are few names absolutely 
without reference.
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In order to answer the questions “how does language work?” and “where 
does linguistic meaning come from?”, I agued for Social Constructivism 
of Language and Meaning (SCLM for short) in another paper. SCLM 
consists of six theses: (1) The primary function of language is commu-
nication rather than representation, so language is essentially a social 
phenomenon. (2) Linguistic meaning originates from the causal inter-
action of humans with the world, and from the social interaction of 
people with people. (3) Linguistic meaning consists in the correlation 
of language to the world established by collective intentions of a lan-
guage community. (4) Linguistic meaning is based on the conventions 
set up by a language community in their long process of communica-
tion. (5) Semantic knowledge is empirical and encyclopedic knowledge 
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condensed and distilled, and the uses of language accepted by a linguis-
tic community. (6) Language and meaning change rapidly or slowly as 
the communicative practice of a linguistic community does. The crucial 
point of SCLM is to focus on the triadic relation among language, hu-
mans (a linguistic community) and the world, rather than the dyadic 
relation between language and the world (cf. Chen Bo 2015: 87).
In this paper, by an appeal to SCLM, I will review the “war” be-
tween descriptivism and referentialism in contemporary philosophy of 
language (cf. Lowe 2007: 27), and argue for a hybrid but still alterna-
tive theory of names—I call it “Socio-historical Causal Descriptivism” 
(SHCD for short). SHCD aims to answer the question of how people use 
names, especially proper names, to refer to their referents in natural 
language, and it contains other six claims: (1) The referring relation 
between a name and an object originates from a generalized “initial 
baptism” of the object. (2) The causal chain of name N transmits in-
formative descriptions of N’s bearer. (3) The meaning1 of N is an open-
ended collection of informative descriptions of N’s bearer acknowledged 
by a linguistic community. (4) With respect to the practical needs of 
agents there is a weighted order in the collection of descriptions of N’s 
bearer. (5) The meaning or even partial meaning of N, together with 
the background of a discourse, the network of knowledge, speaker’s in-
tention, etc., determines the referent of N. (6) All names have their own 
referents, including physical individuals, and parasitic, fi ctional, or in-
tensional objects; there are few names absolutely without reference.
My position about theory of names is quite close to Frank Jackson’s 
as follows:
…What we do with them [viz. sentences containing proper names] makes 
it clear that we—we, the folk—know perfectly well that tokens of “N is F” 
stand at the information—delivering end of an information—preserving 
causal chain, sustained by the way our language community uses the token 
name “N” that fi gures in the sentence, a chain which starts with some kind 
of baptism of the object the information is about. The token name ties the 
sentence to the object the sentence gives information about via the causal 
chain. (Jackson 2010: 138)
Jackson once said: “there have always been defenders of the de-
scription theory, and many of the things I say have been said in one 
form or another, somewhere or other, by someone or other” (1998: 201). 
His saying is almost completely applicable to my situation. When de-
veloping my SHCD, I have got different kinds of inspiration from dif-
ferent scholars, whether they are descriptivists or referentialists, e.g., 
Frege (1892), Russell (1905), Strawson (1950), Searle (1958, 1983), 
Donnellan (1970), Kripke (1972/1980), Dummett (1973, 1981), Evans 
1 The word “meaning” has a wide sense and a narrow sense in modern philosophy 
of language. In its wide sense, “meaning” includes both the sense [Sinn] and 
reference [Bedeutung] of a linguistic expression; in its narrow sense, “meaning” only 
denotes the sense of an expression being understood and grasped by human minds. 
This paper uses the narrow sense of “meaning”.
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(1973), Putnam (1975), Plantinga (1978), Burge (1979), Devitt (1980), 
Lewis (1984), Kroon (1987, 2009), Stanley (1997), Jackson (1998, 2010), 
Devitt  Sterelny (1999), Soames (1998, 2002), Sosa (2001), Salmon 
(1986, 2005), Braun (2006), and so on. However, I want to emphasize 
addition that in my SHCD, I do not only choose something from what 
other scholars have said and combine them into an unitary theory, but 
I also make my own contribution. All of these will be clarifi ed in what 
follows.
A1. Names, including proper and general names, come from generalized 
“initial baptisms” of objects. We usually dub a physical object with a 
proper name by ostension, and dub a theoretical entity with a (general) 
name like “quark” by description.
In Naming and Necessity (1980:71), Kripke reformulates six theses 
of cluster version of descriptivism as the target of his attack, and then 
states thesis (C):
For a successful theory, the account must not be circular. The properties 
which are used in the vote must not themselves involve the notion of refer-
ence in such a way that it is ultimately impossible to eliminate.
He explains further, “(C) is not a thesis but a condition on the satisfac-
tion of the other theses” (1980: 71). Consider some examples clearly vio-
lating the noncircularity condition. Someone uses the name “Socrates”. 
How are we supposed to know to whom he refers? By using the descrip-
tion which gives the sense of it. According to Kneale (1962), the descrip-
tion is “the man called ‘Socrates’ ”. But this description tells us nothing 
at all. Taking it in this way it seems to be no theory of reference at all. 
We ask, “To whom does he refer by ‘Socrates’?” And then the answer is 
given, “Well, he refers to the man to whom he refers”. If this were all 
there was to the meaning of a proper name, then no reference would get 
off the ground at all (cf. Kripke 1980: 70).
Just as Kripke says, some descriptivists indeed make circular 
explanations in order to avoid the diffi culties of fi nding appropriate 
description(s) which uniquely determine the referent of a proper name. 
For instances, metalinguistic descriptivism claims that the name “N” 
can be characterized by such descriptions as “the object called ‘N’”, “the 
bearer of ‘N’”, “the thing which is the bearer of ‘N’”, or “the self-same 
thing which is the bearer of ‘N’” (cf. Bach 1981: 372; Katz 1990: 40, 46), 
etc. Some causal descriptivists think that the referent of N is deter-
mined by some descriptions like “the individual which has been named 
‘N’ in its initial baptism and whose name ‘N’ has been got handed down 
the causal chain” or “the object referred to by others in my linguistic 
community or by my interlocutors as ‘N’”. Clearly, these are the cases 
of reference-borrowing. Moreover, in order to determine the referent of 
“Aristotle”, descriptivists usually appeal to some description like “the 
teacher of Alexander”. The problem is how to determine the referent of 
the new name “Alexander” involved in the new description. If appeal-
ing to some description like “the most powerful one of Aristotle’s stu-
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dents”, we obviously commit the fallacy of circular account. If we assort 
to other descriptions which possibly involve other names, the question 
of “how to determine the referents of other names?” will still come out. 
The former is a obvious circle, and the latter is an infi nite regress.
Other descriptivists design descriptions such as “the entity that this 
body of information is about” (Forbes 1990: 538–539), “the subject of 
this mental dossier” (Nelson 2002: 415). They think that in order to 
determine the referent of N, at fi rst we have to identify a body of infor-
mation or a dossier (how to do this if we don’t know to which object N 
refers?), and then associate the body of information or the mental dos-
sier with an object, and fi nally identify the object satisfying the body 
of information or the dossier as the referent of N. I think, there are too 
many, in Russell’s term, “zigzags”. Let’s consider two possibilities: (i) 
at the beginning, we collect information about an object, and then dub 
the object with name N, fi nally appeal to the information to determine 
the referent of N; (ii) at the beginning, we dub an object with N, later on 
collect the information about the object, fi nally other people appeal to 
the information to identify the referent of N. I’d like to ask a question: 
which of the two alternations is nearly right? My answer: (ii) is more 
close to be correct than (i).
Strawson says: “…one reference may borrow its credentials, as a 
genuinely identifying reference, from another; and that from another. 
But this regress is not [should not be] infi nite” (1959: 182n). Searle 
also considers the parasitic use of names, that is, one speaker’s use of 
a name is parasitic on other speakers’ prior use of the name. He points 
out that the parasitic use of a name is not enough for determining the 
referents of the name, and that it must terminate in somewhere in 
order to determine which object the name designates (1983: 243–244). 
I agree, and I directly assert that reference-borrowing must terminate 
in the generalized initial baptisms of objects. Be a descriptivist or ref-
erentialist, all of us actually have the same starting-point: we dub an 
object with a name in the baptism of that object. After that, we differ 
in replying the following question: How do those people being absent 
from the dubbing event or the subsequent users of the name identify 
the referent of the name?
In the initial baptisms of objects, we dub a physical object in front 
of us with a name by ostension, or dub an unseen object with a name 
by description. As one example of the second way of naming, Le Verrier 
used descriptions to name an astronomical object, i.e. Neptune, which 
had not been found at that time. Without initial baptisms, descriptiv-
ists have no way to avoid circularity. It is Kripke’s thesis (C) that makes 
me, a fi rm (or stubborn?) descriptivist, be aware of this fact. Moreover, I 
want to emphasize that only after an initial baptism by which an object 
is named, does the object enter into our language and cognition. In most 
cases, we can’t talk about an object beyond our horizon without a name: 
what attributes does the object have? What similarity and difference 
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between one object and another are there? Thus, for people who did 
not participate in the baptism of an object, it is absolutely necessary 
for them to know something about the object to which a name refers. 
Since a very small amount of people participate in the dubbing event of 
a particular object– only for them dubbing determines reference, most 
people are not in position to identify the referent of a specifi c name by 
pointing; they have to appeal to descriptions to identify that object. So, 
it is of general interest and great signifi cance to investigate the question 
of how names refer to their referents by means of descriptions.
Here, my position is quite close to Evans’ in his (1982). In terms of 
the roles that participants in a name-using practice might play, Evans 
distinguishes what he calls “producers” from “consumers” in the prac-
tice of using name α to designate object o. A “producer’ in the practice 
of using α to refer to o is somebody who “know o as α”. S know o as α if 
and only if S has a specifi c kind of rapport with o, where the use of α 
forms part of this rapport, e.g. S has the capacity to identify o demon-
stratively and recognize o after breaks in observation. A “consumer” 
with respect to the practice of using α to refer to o is a participant in the 
practice who does not know o as α. “…it is reasonable to attribute to a 
speaker the intention to participate, by his use of a name, in the same 
practice as was being participated in by those speakers from whose use 
of the name the information he has associated with the name derives” 
(1982: 387).
Here, I have other two comments about descriptivism and naming.
First, if not considering the initial baptism of an object in which 
the object was dubbed with a name, in order to avoid the fallacy of 
circularity, descriptivists have to assert that a term has the referent 
it does just because it is associated with a set of descriptions in purely 
general, non-indexical or particular involving terms; these descriptions 
are uniquely satisfi ed by an entity, which then counts as the reference 
of that term. As Strawson argues, this is an impossible task for descrip-
tivists to accomplish: an identifying description “need not be framed in 
purely general terms. In general, indeed, it could not be so framed; it 
is impossible, in general, to free all identifi cation of particulars from 
all dependence upon demonstratively indicatable features of the situ-
ation of reference” (1959: 182n). If baptizing a object with a name was 
introduced into descriptivist picture, then, the participants of the bap-
tizing know the referent of the name. Other people can borrow refer-
ence from the participants, that is, their use of the name is parasitic to 
the use by those participants. Furthermore, when they describe other 
objects to other people, they can use those names which they already 
know what they refer to and how they refer to their referents, more 
straightforwardly, they can use descriptions containing other names. 
As Stanly presents, at least for some descriptivists, “the descriptions 
which fi x referents can, and indeed often must, contain non-descriptive 
elements” (1997: 564).
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Second, naming an object is a social event. Not everyone can give a 
name to an object; instead, denominators must have appropriate social 
status. For example, only parents or respectful persons invited by the 
parents can dub a newborn baby with a name. Naming is also a public 
event, a “game” in which the object to be named, the denominators, and 
the witnesses are involved. Moreover, the spread of a name is also a so-
cial process. It should also be socially evaluated whether or not a name 
is appropriate to an object. If a name is not considered to be proper, the 
relevant object may be re-named. A person can have his “nickname” or 
“penname”. Sometimes the nickname or penname becomes so popular 
that the original was forgotten or only known by a small amount of 
people. Consider the names “Mark Twin” and “Samuel Clemens”. So 
to speak, the naming relation of a name to an object is socially con-
ventionalized: it is not only semantic relations of names to objects, 
but also social relations among names, the corresponding objects, and 
our linguistic community. Generally speaking, there are three ways to 
guarantee that an object is successfully named: (i) People who have ap-
propriate social status name an object by pointing; (ii) People who have 
appropriate social status name an object by description; (iii) Experts in 
their professional fi elds name a theoretic entity like quark with which 
ordinary people are not familiar.
A2. In the causal-historical chain of communication, the descriptive in-
formation about what name N refers to is passed on from one person to 
another and from one generation to the next; thus, the causal-historical 
chain of N is a chain starting from the dubbing of an object with N and 
preserving information about that object as N’s bearer.
Kripke claims that after the initial baptism, “through various sorts 
of talk the name is spread from kink to link as if by a chain” (1980: 91). 
He argues, the chain fi rstly and mainly transmits the referent of name 
N, although it also could transmit information about N’s bearer so that 
it could be a chain for transmitting information. When hearing N from 
somewhere, even though speakers at the far end of the chain are non-
informed (ignorance), mis-informed (error), or poorly-informed (insuf-
fi ciency) about the referent of N, they still can use N to refer to that 
object. Kripke states the condition as follows for successful transmis-
sion of reference in the chain, and accept the possibility that something 
is mistakenly transferred in the chain:
…When the name is ‘passed from link to link’, the receiver of the name must, 
I think, intend when he learns it to use it with the same reference as the man 
from whom he heard it. If I heard the name ‘Napoleon’ and decide it would 
be a nice name for my pet aardvark, I do not satisfy this condition. (Kripke 
1980: 96; emphasis added)
…Obviously, the name is passed on from link to link. But of course not 
every sort of causal chain reaching from me to a certain man will do for me 
to make a reference. There may be a causal chain from our use of the term 
‘Santa Claus’ to a certain historical saint, but still the children, when they 
use this, by this time probably do not refer to that saint. (Kripke 1980: 93)
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I have three comments about the causal chain of N.
(1) The causal chain of N is a chain preserving information about 
N’s bearer; only by means of preserving information about N’s bearer, 
can the chain transmit the referent of N. Without the least informa-
tion such as “N is an X” (here X is a sortal), e.g. “Dan is my pet dog”, 
nobody can take any word s/he heard to be a name. Only based on such 
information can a hearer judge that the word s/he heard is a name of an 
object. The following citation from Kripke is puzzling to me:
…A mathematician’s wife overhears her husband muttering the name ‘Nan-
cy’. She wonders, whether Nancy, the thing to which her husband referred, 
is a woman or a Lie group. Why isn’t her use of ‘Nancy’ a case of naming? If 
it isn’t, the reason is not indefi niteness of her reference. (Kripke 1980: 116n)
That is the alleged case of ignorance against descriptivism: even if one 
person know nothing about what thing a name designates, s/he still can 
use the name to refer to what it designates. Back to Kripke’s example: 
although the mathematician’s wife has no idea of what thing Nancy 
is, or of whom Nancy is, she still can use “Nancy” as a name to refer 
something or somebody. But I have serious doubt with this claim: how 
does the wife know that “nancy” is a name rather than a noise from her 
husband, since he also mutters something like “haha” and “bala”? why 
is “nancy” a name but “haha” or “bala” not? In my understanding, she 
takes “Nancy” as a name but does not take “haha” and “bala” as names, 
just because as one competent English speaker she has common sense 
that in English “Nancy” is usually used as the name of a female, but in 
few time “haha’ and “bala” are used as the names of objects. However, 
“usually” does’nt mean “always”, and “few” doesn’t mean “never”. Con-
sider such a possibility: the mathematician pronounces “nancy” just for 
fun, exactly like he pronounces “haha” and “bala”. All these “noises” 
serve the same purpose: to amuse himself and make himself relax. It is 
reported that some African people have very long and strange names: 
some words, such as “pain”, “nuisance”, “Good by”, “Friday”, are used in 
the names of African people. I think, if an agent is completely ignorant 
of a language, he has no reason to identify any word of that language 
s/he heard as the name of some object; also, if he has no information 
about an object to which a name refers and also cannot identify the 
referent of the name demonstratively, he has no reason to regard any 
word s/he heard as the name of that object, unless he names the object 
to which he faces by himself.2
Perhaps we should consider the cases of “Cicero” and “Feynman” 
discussed by Kripke (1980: 81). About what the name “Cicero” desig-
nates, many people know only that he was “a famous orator of ancient 
2 Evans also investigates what conditions have to be satisfi ed by an expression 
x and an item y for x to be a name of y. In his view, “NN” is a name of x if (and only 
if): (i) There is a community in which people use “NN” to refer to x; (ii) It is common 
knowledge that “NN” is so used; (iii) The reference in (i) relies on the knowledge in 
(ii), and not on the knowledge that x satisfi es some predicate embedded in “NN” (cf. 
Evans 1973: 1, 18).
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Rome”, and about “Feynman” only that he was “a physicist or some-
thing”. Obviously that such description(s) is not suffi cient for fi xing 
the referent of the corresponding name uniquely, but people still use 
it as the name of a person. My reply: Yes, people still use “Cicero” and 
“Feynman” separately as a name for Cicero and Feynman, because they 
have known that Cicero is a famous Roman orator, and Feynman is a 
physicist. Based on such little information, they know that both “Ci-
cero” and “Feynman” are used by other people as the names of two hu-
man beings. Since the information is so poor and insuffi cient, they are 
not in position to pick out two men to which two names refer. However, 
as the members of their linguistic community, their uses of two names 
are parasitic to the uses by other members of the community. Although 
they don’t know exactly what individuals to which two names refer, 
but some other members know. They borrow reference from the other 
members of the community who know.
(2) In the causal chain of N, only information about N’s bearer can 
guarantee that the intention of present speakers is in accord with that 
of previous speakers.
In order to guarantee that the referent of a name is transferred suc-
cessfully down the chain, Kripke just mentions one condition that in 
using names which s/he heard from other speakers a hearer must keep 
the same intention with the speakers’. Kripke stops here and does not 
make further enquiry. But I want to ask a question: how do we make 
sure that the condition will be satisfi ed? In my view, if N’s bearer is 
absent in the place of utterance, then speakers cannot transmit the 
referent of N to hearers by pointing. They have to say something about 
N’s bearer in order to make hearers know that they are talking about 
the object to which name N refers. Just as my analysis of the case of 
“Nancy” shows, if without the least necessary information, there will be 
no successful reference-transmission, even no name transmitted. This 
is the fi rst point which I want to emphasize here.
Secondly, different information will result in different reference, 
even result in different names. For instance, two guys talk about a 
man named “John Lycan”, but one talks about a man born in a wealthy 
family, who himself is a distinguished professor of a well-known Ameri-
can university, publishes several good books, and often travels abroad 
to deliver lecture; another talks about a man born in an impoverished 
family, who himself is fortunately a gifted football player, makes a 
huge amount of money, and lives a quite decent life. Under such cir-
cumstance, two talkers will know soon that they are talking about dif-
ferent persons happened to have the literal “same” name(s).
Thirdly, mistaken or insuffi cient information will produce mistaken 
reference, called “reference-shift”. For instance, Evans mentions the 
case of “Madagascar”. Originally, it named a portion of the African 
mainland. But, misunderstood by Marco Polo, it became attached in-
stead to the great island off the coast of Africa (Evans 1973: 11). Despite 
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the fact that there is a continuous “chain” of derived uses of the name 
‘Madagascar’ going back to the baptism of the mainland, the name as 
used now refers to an island. The reason why the reference-shift happen 
is that the information is wrongly transmitted by Marco Polo. Kripke 
himself also mentions that “Santa Claus” might originally designate a 
certain historical saint, but today children use it to refer to a fi ctional 
fi gure in religion (Kripke 1980: 93). This is a case of “reference-failure”: 
a name from “referring” to “empty”, viz. not referring. Why does this 
phenomenon happen? One reasonable explanation is that there is no 
suffi cient information transferred down to children today.
Fourthly, new information will result in new reference, even new 
names. I call such situation “reference-regeneration”. For instances, a 
certain name was originally taken to designate a mythological fi gure, 
but new archaeological evidence shows that the name refers to a real 
historical fi gure, so the name changes from “empty” to “referring”; Or 
a certain name originally designated a fi ctional fi gure, but later people 
used this term to refer to a real person, and this man was so famous 
in history that people forgot the fact that this name once denoted a 
fi ctional character. Certainly, in the cases of so-called “reference-regen-
eration”, actually there are two pairs of names which refer to two pairs 
of people, but we cannot ignore the fact that each pair of names is liter-
ally “same”, and there is some kind of continuous history in that pair.
I’d like to include reference-shift, reference-failure, reference-regen-
eration together under the title “reference-shift”. In my view, the fun-
damental reason why reference-shift happens is that when information 
about N’s bearer is transmitted down a causal chain of N, people com-
mit some mistakes about the information of N’s bearer consciously or 
unconsciously.
Here, I want to talk something more about the causal chain of N. 
Actually, whether be descriptivists, such as Evans and Searle, or be 
referentialists, such as Kripke and Donnellan, there are quite many 
similarities between their conceptions of names: they both (at least 
could) agree that there are causal, historical, chains of communication, 
in which names get handed down from one person to another, from one 
generation to the next; and they both require intentional components 
(the intention to refer). What distinguish descriptivists from referen-
tialists are their different answers to some key questions, e.g., what is 
it that is transmitting down the causal chain about a name? Clearly, it 
is not just the name; it is the name plus something else that is conven-
tionally associated with the name. For descriptivists, what is conven-
tionally associated with the name is a sense (or description, or cluster 
of descriptions, or way of picking something out); For Kripke, what 
is conventionally associated with the name is an object. Another key 
question is: how are names connected to their referents? Frege claims 
that there is an intermediary, i.e. a sense; Searle asserts that “objects 
are not given to us prior to our system of representation”, and so our 
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representations intervene between name and referent (Searle 1983: 
326). But Kripke maintains that the connection is unmediated: names 
are directly referential. It is these points which distinguish descriptiv-
ists and referentialists apart.
A3. Only informative descriptions of N’s bearer acknowledged by our 
linguistic community constitute the meaning or partial meaning of N. 
These descriptions describe the features of that object, and the collection 
is always open-ended and vague to some extent.
At fi rst, I want to make clear what is really the semantic reference of a 
linguistic expression. I agree with Strawson’s claim: “‘Mentioning’, ‘re-
ferring’ is not something an expression does; it is something that some-
one can use an expression to do” (1950: 326; emphasis added). Even 
Kripke himself thinks that the semantic reference of a designator in a 
given idiolect (which usually includes a large linguistic community) is 
the thing which is determined by the conventions or rules of the idiolect 
together with facts about the world (e.g. which satisfi es the descriptive 
property in question) on the occasion of use of the designator (cf. Kripke 
1977: 111). In my view, since the conventions or rules of a language 
are the business of a linguistic community, the semantic referent of a 
designator could be said to be the thing to which the linguistic commu-
nity takes the designator refer. Especially for a defi nite description, its 
semantic reference is not the factual satisfi er of that description, but the 
object which our linguistic community think satisfi es that description. I 
will make this idea clear further in what follows.
In my view, in the causal chain of name N, not all the informative 
descriptions of N’s bearer are preserved: some are thrown away or for-
gotten, because they are not accepted as true by our linguistic commu-
nity; some are revised, because they are partly true and partly false. 
Only those informative descriptions acknowledged by our linguistic 
community are preserved, getting handed down the causal chain. Fi-
nally, they become a part of public beliefs about that object, and enter 
into dictionaries or encyclopedias. In some sense, dictionaries or en-
cyclopedias are just the summarization or refi nement of our previous 
cognitive achievements, so they have experiential origins and contents, 
and can be enlarged, revised, or even replaced by our new epistemic 
achievements (cf. Chen Bo 2015: 103–104). It is important for agents 
to know the informative descriptions of N’s bearer accepted as true by 
our linguistic community, because only these descriptions determine 
the referent of N, constitute a linguistic or cultural tradition about the 
use of N, and even a part of the capacity of a competent language-user 
to properly use N.3
3 Evans admits that there are indeed causal relations or causal chains with 
respect to the use of names, but Kripke “has mislocated the causal relation; the 
important causal relation lies between that item’s states and doings and the 
speaker’s body of information—not between the item’s being dubbed with a name 
and the speaker’s contemporary use of it” (Evans 1973: 13).
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I will introduce symbols to characterize the meaning of name N: 
let lowercase letters, a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j, k,… separately stand for a 
description of N’s bearer. Some descriptions are not accepted as true by 
our linguistic community, so they will not enter into the collection of 
descriptions as the meaning of N; only those description acknowledged 
by our linguistic community enter into the collection about N’s bearer: 
a, b, c, d, e, f, … , in which “…” shows that there are some members 
outside of the listed, and we can change the members of the collection 
if necessary, that is, let some old member(s) get out, and some new 
member(s) come in, if we get new evidence; so the collection is always 
open-ended and is vague to some extent. Since the collection illustrates 
the consensus of our linguistic community about N’s bearer, and gen-
erally acknowledged by our linguistic community, so an operator  for 
consensus can be put in the front of the collection as a superscript: 
a, b, c, d, e, f, … . This kind of collection of descriptions determines 
the referent of N. Of course, we could have some other collections of 
descriptions of N’s bearer by means of our counterfactual imagination, 
e.g., -a, -b, -c, -d, -e, f, g, h, j, k, … , -a, b, -c, -d, e, -f, u, v, w, x, … , 
in which ‘-a’ shows that a is absent, and so forth. These collections do 
not constitute the meaning or partial meaning of N, because they have 
not been agreed by our linguistic community. We can’t use them to 
determine the referent of N, at least we can’t use them to identify the 
object to which we usually use N to refer.
From this perspective, the so-called “counterexamples”, such as 
Gödel/Schmidt case, Peano/Dedekind case, Johna-Moses-Aristotle cas-
es, of descriptivism given by Kripke in his semantic argument, could be 
explained away. Here, I will consider the fi rst two.
Kripke conceives a counterfactual situation. Gödel had a friend 
called “Schmidt”, who had actually proved the incompleteness of arith-
metic. But Gödel somehow got hold of the manuscript and published it 
in his own name. Then Gödel achieved fame as “the man who discov-
ered the incompleteness of arithmetic”. However, in fact, the real refer-
ent of that description is the man Schmidt. If “Gödel” is synonymous 
with the description “the man who discovered the incompleteness of 
arithmetic”, does “Gödel” change its referent into the man Schmidt? 
Kripke replies “No”, “Gödel” still designates the person called “Gödel” 
whereas the description “the man who discovered the incompleteness 
of arithmetic” refers to the man Schmidt, because Schmidt is actually 
the person satisfying that description, and we make a mistake when 
using the description to refer to Gödel.
I can reply to Kripke as follows. In your argument, I fi nd an implicit 
supposition: the question of “how does some description(s) refer to an 
object?” just concerns the relation between the description(s) and its 
satisfi er, between a language and the world, which are only the mat-
ters of fact, and has nothing to do with the intentions, conventions and 
customs of our linguistic community in using the description(s) and the 
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language. In other words, the semantic referent of some description(s) 
is just the object which in fact satisfi es the description(s), rather than 
the object to which our linguistic community takes the description(s) 
to refer. But I have argued that this supposition is wrong (cf. Chen Bo 
2013a: 423–433). Here, I just reply Kripke very shortly: your fabricat-
ed story is not acknowledged by our linguistic community; your fancy 
about Gödel is not in the causal chain of the name “Gödel”. Therefore, 
we can still believe that the description “the man who discovered the 
incompleteness of arithmetic” designates the man Gödel rather than 
the man Schmidt. However, if your imagined situation is supported 
by good evidence and agreed by our linguistic community, perhaps we 
will cut off the connection of the name “Gödel” with the description “the 
man who discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic”, and establish 
a new connection of the description with the name “Schmidt”. Perhaps 
we will also build up the connection of the name “Gödel” with the new 
description “the notorious man who stole Schmidt’s proof of the incom-
pleteness of arithmetic”. Just as Kripke himself says,
In general our reference depends not just on what we think ourselves, but 
on other people in the community, the history of how the name reached one, 
and things like that. It is by following such a history that one gets to the 
reference. (Kripke 1980: 95)
Kripke also talks about Peano-Dedekind case. It is commonly be-
lieved that Peano is the man who discovered certain axioms which 
characterize the sequence of natural numbers. But actually it is De-
dekind who discovered these axioms earlier; thus the description “the 
man who discovered certain axioms which characterize the sequence 
of natural numbers” denotes Dedekind. Many people mistake Einstein 
for both the discoverer of the theory of relativity and the inventor of 
the atomic bomb. But actually it was not a single person but a group of 
people who invented the atomic bomb. Similarly, many people regard 
Columbus as the fi rst man to know that the earth was round and the 
fi rst man to discover America. However, there might have been some-
one else who is the semantic referent of these descriptions, whereas 
“Columbus” still refers to the person originally called “Columbus”.
My reply is similar to the Gödel-Schmidt case. What is of great 
signifi cance is not what Peano, Einstein, and Columbus have actual-
ly done, but what is acknowledged by our linguistic community. Our 
community even makes a series of institutional arrangement about 
academic acknowledge, such as anonymous referee, open-access pub-
lication, objections and replies, discussion and debate, citation data as 
infl uential factor, public reward system, and so on. Only those descrip-
tions of a scientist agreed by our community can be regarded as the 
part of the “offi cial” history of the person and constitute the meaning or 
partial meaning of the relevant name. In contrast, those descriptions of 
the person rejected by our community will be forgotten, or just become 
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the topics of chat, gossip, or casual conversation at leisure time. We 
never consider those descriptions seriously.
In sum, my idea is this: the meaning of a name depends on consen-
sus of our community rather than somebody’s wild imagination, and a 
name or description designates what our language community agrees 
to use it to designate. In semantics, there is no pure matters of fact, the 
intentionality of a linguistic community must be considered.
A4. With respect to the practical needs of agents, there is a weighted 
order in the collection of informative descriptions of N’s bearer; that is, 
in the collection some descriptions are more important or central than 
others for determining the referent of N.
When restating the cluster version of descriptivism about names, 
Kripke mentions thesis (3): “if most, or a weighted most, of the φ’s are 
satisfi ed by one unique object y, then y is the referent of ‘X’” (Kripke 
1980: 71, emphasis added). That is to say, traditional descriptivists do 
not give equal weight to all the descriptions in the collection. When 
identifying what a name designates, some descriptions are more impor-
tant or central than others. Evans thinks, the denotation of a name is 
fi xed by the bodies of information; a particular object is the dominant 
source of the descriptions we associate with the name, and it is the 
dominant description that plays a crucial role in determining the refer-
ent of a name (Evans 1973: 15–17). Putnam notices that the stereotype 
of “tiger” includes such features as “being an animal”, “being big-cat-
like”, “having black stripes on a yellow ground”. He assumes that the 
feature “being an animal” is more central than others, because it is im-
possible to conceive that tigers might not have been animals (Putnam 
1975: 188–190). In my view, the members of the collection of descrip-
tions about N’s bearer have to be organized into some kind of structure.
I suspect that Kripke might implicitly hold a similar position. For 
him, most descriptions are non-rigid designator because they usually 
describe the superfi cial or accidental features of their objects; however, 
some descriptions are rigid designator, such as “the positive odd num-
ber less than 2”, “the element with the atomic number 79” and “H2O”, 
because they characterize the essence of the corresponding objects. Es-
sence is what an object or natural kind necessarily has, i.e. what it has 
in all possible worlds in which it exists. According to Kripke, the es-
sence of an individual such as “Aristotle” is its origin; the essence of an 
artefact such as “table” is its constituent material; and the essence of a 
natural kind like “tiger” is its internal structure. The descriptions about 
essence will refer to an object or a natural kind in all possible worlds in 
which the object or the kind exists, so they are rigid designators. Thus, 
essential descriptions of an object are more weighted than others.
I myself also think that not all the descriptions in the collection 
have equal weight. When determining the referent of a name, some 
descriptions are more important than others because they are essen-
tial descriptions. In a long interview by BBC, Quine says that so-called 
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“essence” is what is most important; the essence of a thing depends on 
how the thing is described. But he thinks that since we could not make 
it clear that what is the most important about an object, we could not 
explain clearly what essence is. So he rejects essentialism, taken it as 
a notorious form of Platonism. Putnam says that “importance is an 
interest-relative notion” (Putnam 1975: 157), that is, it depends on our 
interest to decide which properties more important than others. I ap-
plaud to this brand of essentialism. I think that the importance is rela-
tive to the agent’s interest. By introducing the parameter “with respect 
to humans’ interest”, I will relativize and thus diversify the essence of 
an object. For example, the essence of human beings for zoologists is 
different from that for sociologists. If we can generalize common need 
of humans’ cognition and practice, then we could fi nd out the general 
essence of an object. For instance, the general essence of human beings 
might be “the animals that are able to speak, to think, and to make 
tools”. This version of essentialism can be called “interest-relative es-
sentialism”, whose details and arguments have to be left to other pa-
pers.
In his paper (2011), Costa criticizes the traditional cluster theory 
of proper names because a cluster has no internal structure, being 
completely disordered: all descriptions belonging to the cluster seem 
to have the same value and play the same identifying role. He wants 
to put an order into this mess. He distinguishes all the descriptions of 
an object in the cluster into two groups. One consists of fundamental 
descriptions, including “(i) a localizing description, which gives the spa-
tio-temporal location and career of the object, and (ii) a characterizing 
description, which gives what are considered the most relevant proper-
ties of the object, those that give us the reason to use the name in refer-
ring to it” (Costa 2011: 260). Another consists of auxiliary descriptions 
which seem to connect a name with its bearer in a more or less acciden-
tal fashion. The second group includes metaphorical descriptions, ac-
cidental but well-known descriptions, accidental and usually unknown 
descriptions, adventitious descriptions (Costa 2011: 261–262). Then, 
Costa formulates a meta-descriptive rule MDR:
A proper name N is used to refer to the object x belonging to a cer-
tain class C of objects, iff it can be assumed that x properly originates 
our awareness that
(i–a) x satisfi es its localizing description for N, and/or
(i–b) x satisfi es its characterizing description for N, and
(ii) x satisfi es the description(s) suffi ciently, and
(iii) x satisfi es the description(s) better than any other object belonging 
to C.
 (Costa 2011: 270)
Obviously, Costa and I have a similar viewpoint that there is a struc-
ture in the descriptions-cluster of an object. But my position is quite 
different from his in other sides, e.g. I pay much more attention to the 
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role of a linguistic community for determining the meaning and refer-
ence of a name than he does. In my view, fi rst, the distinction of fun-
damental and auxiliary descriptions makes sense only with respect to 
the practical needs of agents. Take “Aristotle” for an example. We can 
characterize Aristotle as a famous scholar, a philosopher, a linguist, a 
biologist, an educator,  so the relevant characterizing and auxiliary 
descriptions about him will be radically different: fundamental descrip-
tions in one encyclopedia will become auxiliary ones in another, vice 
versa. Secondly, only those descriptions acknowledged by our linguistic 
community can become the meaning or partial meaning of the name 
which refers to the object. Thirdly, we cannot exactly determine how 
many descriptions an object has to satisfy in order to be the referent of 
a name, since in replying this issue, we consider not only the quantity 
of descriptions, but also the order of descriptions in the cluster, and 
even the practical needs of agents.
A5. The meaning or even partial meaning of N, together with the back-
ground of a discourse, the network of knowledge, speaker’s intention, 
etc., determines the referent of N.
Kripke puts forward his semantic argument against descriptivism 
as follows:
P1 If descriptivism is correct, then, the meaning of name N, 
which is given by one description or a cluster of descriptions, 
should provide a set of necessary and suffi cient conditions 
for determining what N designates.
P2 In fact, the corresponding description(s) cannot supply such 
a set of conditions for fi xing the referent of N.
C Descriptivism is wrong.4
I judge that P1 of the semantic argument of Kripke’s does not hold, 
because it relies on a problematic assumption, namely, descriptivists 
have to hold two claims: (i) If name N has its meaning and the meaning 
is given by some description(s), the description(s) should provide a set 
of necessary and suffi cient conditions for determining the referent of N; 
(ii) It is possible for us to fi nd out such a set of necessary and suffi cient 
conditions for determining N’s bearer. I have argued that the assump-
tion is wrong (cf. Chen Bo 2013a: 435–438).
In my view, when determining what a name designates, it is abso-
lutely necessary to fi x different domains of discourse in different con-
texts. These domains are usually smaller than the Universe containing 
all the actual individuals in the external world, and much smaller than 
the Super-Domain containing all the possible individuals in all pos-
sible worlds. When determining the referent of a name by means of its 
meaning, actually we choose the referent from the specifi c domain of 
4 Salmon regards the semantic arguments as “the strongest and most persuasive 
of the three kinds of arguments for the primary thesis of the direct reference theory” 
(Salmon 2005: 29).
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discourse rather than always from the Universe or the Super-Domain. 
Under such contexts of utterance, only a few ordinary descriptions are 
required to identify the referent of a name, since only a fi nite number 
of individuals are in that place.
For example, “the girl dressed in red clothes” is not enough to deter-
mine the referent of any name, since there are too many girls dressed 
in red clothes in the world, let alone the amount in all possible worlds. 
However, there are only a small number of people in a particular con-
text. When one asks “who is Lori?” someone else replies that “Lori is 
the girl dressed in red clothes”. If there is exactly one girl dressed in 
red clothes in that place, only by using the description about surface 
feature of a person, can we identify to whom the name “Lori” refers. 
If there happen to be many girls dressed in red clothes, we can keep 
talking to give more descriptive information in order to identify the 
referent of “Lori”.
I agree with Searle’s idea that speakers’ intention, Network and 
Background play a crucial role in determining what a name designates. 
Network includes personal convictions, scientifi c knowledge, and the 
existence of social practices and institutions, and it is in virtue of the 
network that humans succeed in having meaningful experiences or 
saying meaningful things. Background is the set of abilities, capacities, 
tendencies, and dispositions that humans have; it itself is non-repre-
sentational and non-intentional. For example, when someone invites 
me to attend his/her wedding, I know that I have to dress formally and 
bring him/her signifi cant gift(s); when someone invites me to join a 
country music, I know that I can dress casually and behave quite wild, 
even though the obvious request does not include this kind of details. 
Background beliefs give clues to my judgment and choice. Here, just 
consider one example as follows.
Donnellan (1970: 335–58) makes a bold envisagement. Suppose 
that all that a certain speaker knows or thinks he knows about Tha-
les is that he is the Greek philosopher who said that all is water. But 
suppose that there was no Greek philosopher who said such a thing, 
and Aristotle and Herodotus were referring to a well digger who said, 
“I wish all was water so I wouldn’t have to dig these damned wells”. 
Further, suppose that there was a hermit who had no contact with any-
one, who actually held that all was water. Furthermore, suppose that 
Herodotus had heard a frog at the bottom of a well making croaking 
noises that sounded like the Greek for “all is water”; this frog happened 
to be a family pet named “Thales”, and this incident is the origin of the 
view that somebody held that all is water. Then, we will meet a serious 
question: when using the name “Thales”, do we refer to the Greek phi-
losopher, the well digger, the hermit, or the frog? Searle argues that in 
order to answer this question, we have to rely on the relevant Network 
of Intentionality. When we say “Thales is the Greek philosopher who 
held that all is water”, we do not just mean anybody who held that all 
is water, we mean that person who was known to other Greek philoso-
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phers as arguing that all is water, who was called in his time or subse-
quently by people as “Thales”, whose works and ideas have come down 
to us posthumously through the writings of other authors, and so on.
…in all these cases there will be an external causal account of how we got 
that information, but what secures reference is not the external causal 
chain, but the sequence of the transfer of Intentional contents. The reason 
we are not tempted to allow the hermit to qualify as Thales is that he simply 
does not fi t into the Network and the Background. (Searle 1983: 252–253)
I think that in a specifi c context, sometimes we can determine what 
a name designates just by one description, while sometimes we can 
achieve this by a cluster of descriptions. Can we generally explain how 
many descriptions we need to determine the referent of a name? No, 
because we also have to consider the speaker’s intention, Network and 
Background when determining the referent of a name. Therefore, just 
like the question “how does a name designate an object?”, the question 
“how do we identify what a name refers to?” is also relative to many 
social factors; it depends on the interplay of these factors to determine 
the referent of a name.
I think, it is the right place to reply shortly Kripke’s epistemic argu-
ment against descriptivism. The argument runs like this:
P1 If descriptivism is correct, that is, name N is synonymous 
with its relevant description “the F”, then “N is the F” 
should be knowable a priori.
P2 In fact, “N is the F” is not knowable a priori.
C Descriptivism is wrong.
For example, consider two sentences:
(1) Aristotle is Aristotle.
(2) Aristotle is the teacher of Alexander the Great.
Kripke thinks, according to descriptivism, “Aristotle” is synonymous 
with the description “the teacher of Alexander the Great”; then, if sub-
stituting the second occurrence of “Aristotle” with “the teacher of Alex-
ander the Great” in (1), we get (2). Since (1) is knowable a priori, so is 
(2). Actually, (2) is essentially an empirical statement, we have to judge 
its truth value completely based on historical documents and other em-
pirical evidence. So, (2) is absolutely not knowable a priori. Therefore, 
descriptivism is wrong.
I have two comments about the epistemic argument:
First, I don’t think descriptivists have to hold such position that a 
name is synonymous with some relevant description(s). I take myself 
as a fi rm descriptivist, but don’t accept the synonymy thesis that “Aris-
totle” is synonymous with “the teacher of Alexander the Great”. In my 
view, the meaning of name N consists in the collection of informative 
descriptions of N’s bearer acknowledged by our linguistic community, 
and these descriptions describe the features of the object. Since the ob-
ject as the referent of N and our cognition about that object are always 
in the process of change, so the collection of informative descriptions of 
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N’s bearer is open-ended, and is vague to one degree or another. There-
fore, N cannot be strictly synonymous with any defi nite description, 
even with the collection of such descriptions.
Second, even if we temporarily accept the synonymy thesis, we still 
cannot get the conclusion that (2) is knowable a priori. As I argued in 
Chen Bo (2015: 106–108), semantic knowledge is empirical and encyclo-
pedic knowledge, including the uses of language accepted by a linguistic 
community; it is the condensation, refi nement, and summarization of 
our previous epistemic achievements, so it has empirical content and 
origin. Quine emphasizes: “The lexicographer is an empirical scientist, 
whose business is the recording of antecedent facts; and if he glosses 
‘bachelor’ as ‘unmarried man’ it is because of his belief that there is a 
relation of synonymy between these forms, implicit in general or pre-
ferred usage prior to his own work” (Quine 1953: 24). Why we can sub-
stitute “Aristotle” with the description “the teacher of Alexander the 
Great” in (1)? Because empirical evidence shows us that Aristotle is the 
teacher of Alexander the Great, we make use of this empirical message 
to do the substitution, then we get (2). So, (2) is also based on empirical 
evidence, and is just knowable a posteriori. For more details, see Bo 
(2013b).
Let a is a proper name, b is the corresponding description rele-
vant with a, I can generalize the form of Kripke’s epistemic argument 
against descriptivism as follows:
(1) It is knowable a priori that a is a;
(2) a = b;
So, (3) It is knowable a priori that a is b.
Kripke argues, since it is not knowable a priori that a is b, we should 
deny the descriptivist premise (2); Therefore, descriptivism about name 
is wrong. 
But in my judgement, this argument is not sound, because it 
makes use of the principle of substitution which is problematic: 
KF(a)(a=b)KF(b), here “K” means “know”. Rather, It should appeal 
to the valid principle of substitution: KF(a)K(a=b)KF(b). (3) can fol-
low not from (1) and (2), but from (1) and (2): It is knowable a priori 
that a is b. Since descriptivists don’t accept (2) as true, Kripke’s epis-
temic argument collapses.
A6. All names have their own referents, including physical individuals, 
and parasitic, fi ctional, or intensional objects. So there are few names 
absolutely without reference.
In my view, the referential relation between a name and an object 
is not an objective relation between the two; on the contrary, a com-
plete understanding of the referential relation of a name and an object 
involves three elements: speakers’ intention, the meaning of name N, 
and the object to which N refers. Which object N designates depends on 
what a speaker intends to use N to designate. Moreover, what names 
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designate can be classifi ed as follows: physical objects, parasitic ob-
jects, fi ctional objects, and intensional objects. The last three groups 
may be called “abstract objects”.
Obviously, in our language, many names refer to physical objects 
which exist in the actual world, i.e. in space and time, can be perceived 
by us, and have causal effect with each other. For example, there are 
names of people, such as “Socrates” and “Einstein”; names of natural 
objects, such as “Sun” and “Earth”; names of places, such as “Oxford” 
and “Tokyo”; names of countries, such as “China” and “United States”; 
names of organizations or political parties, such as “UNESCO”, “Ja-
pan’s Liberal Democratic Party”; names of books, such as “The Orga-
non” and “Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection”; names 
of events, such as “American War of Independence” and “the Second 
World War”. And so on. Physical objects are very close to “primary sub-
stance” called by Aristotle: “Substance, in the truest and primary and 
most defi nite sense of the word, is that which is neither predicable of 
a subject nor pr esent in a subject; for instance, the individual man or 
horse” (Categories, 2a13–14). “Moreover, primary substances are most 
properly called s ubstances in virtue of the fact that they are the enti-
ties which underlie ev erything e lse, and that everything else is either 
predicated of them or present in them” (Categories, 2b14–17). Moreover, 
physical objects include theo retical entities in natural sciences, such as 
atoms, electrons, photons, and other particles, which cannot be directly 
perceived by humans, but can be discerned by means of instruments.
There are also names designating parasitic objects supervened 
on physical individuals. Individuals come fi rst, but they are not bare 
particulars without any property or quality. An individual itself has 
certain properties and also is related to other individuals. Individuals 
can be classifi ed into different kinds or classes, such as animal, human 
being, and plant. In biology, there is a classifi cation system consisting 
of species, genus, family, order, class, phylum, and kingdom. There are 
natural kind terms such as “cat”, “tiger”, and “lion”. Without natural 
kind terms, we have to meet serious diffi culties in our ordinary talk, 
and even our scientifi c system will collapse. Although kinds or classes 
are the results of abstract thinking, they still have some kinds of objec-
tive existence. An object has property, and there are some relations be-
tween or amongst objects; these constitute so-called “states of affairs” 
or “facts”. Although states of affairs or facts are different from individu-
als since they are very diffi cult to be individualized, they are still objec-
tive. What mass terms such as “gold”, “wood”, “water”, “fi re”, and “soil” 
designate cannot be individualized either, but they certainly exist in 
the actual world. Physical individuals always exist in space and time. 
Moreover, everything is in process of change, and their change follows 
regularities and laws. Since things are objective, so are the regularities 
and laws followed by them. In this way, we have a variety of entities 
supervened on or being parasitic to physical objects, such as qualities, 
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relations, classes or kinds, laws, etc. Certainly, these entities do not 
exist in space and time as substances, but it is reasonable to affi rm 
that there are such kinds of supervened or parasitic entities; otherwise, 
physical objects will become pure abstraction or nothingness. Besides, 
there are another kind of abstract objects, such as natural numbers, 
real numbers, and complex numbers.
There are names denoting fi ctional objects, which do not exist in the 
actual world, but are created by human intellects. For example, there 
are various characters in Greek mythology, such as Gaea, Zeus, Posei-
don, Apollo, Athena, Hermes, Dionysus; various characters in science 
fi ction such as Superman, Spiderman, Harry Potter, Batman; a variety 
of literary fi gures such as Hamlet and Sherlock Holmes. Names denot-
ing such kinds of objects are usually called “empty names”, because 
the objects to which they refer are not real, i.e., not exist in the actual 
world. The phrase “empty names” may come from Russell’s “robust 
feeling for reality”:
Logic, I should maintain, must no more admit a unicorn than zoology can; 
for logic is concerned with the real world just as truly as zoology, though 
with its more abstract and general features. (Russell 1919: 169)
I think that Russell’s position confl icts with our linguistic intuition and 
common sense. In natural languages, there are many names denoting 
fi ctional characters. We usually consider that these names are referring 
to something rather than nothing, because we can talk and exchange 
our opinions about them understandably. Besides, some mythological 
and literary fi gures have played very important roles in shaping the 
cultural identity of a nation.5 Why does logic, philosophy, and seman-
tics exclude these names? Is the talk about them beyond the limit of 
reason? I do not think so, I do not like the phrase “empty names”.
There are names denoting intensional objects, including concepts, 
propositions, beliefs, thoughts, theories, and doctrines, etc. For in-
stances, the concept “prime number,” the proposition that no bachelor 
is married, Archimedes Principle, Law of Universal Gravitation, Social 
Contract Theory, and Pragmatism. These objects depend on our lin-
guistic actions, and can be grasped by different human minds, so they 
are inter-subjective. There are fi erce debates about the existence of 
such kind of objects. We often meet two extremes: one is held by Frege 
and Popper, admitting objective thoughts or knowledge as entities; and 
the other is by Quine, rejecting any intentional entities like meaning 
and proposition.
I call physical and parasitic objects “actual existence” or “reality”. 
There are causal relations among actual objects and between actual ob-
jects and human beings. We can give the following criteria for “reality”: 
all actual objects have causal effects on perceivable material bodies, 
and we explain the changes of these material bodies by means of such 
5 In his paper “Nonexistence” (1998), Salmon acknowledges the existence of 
literary fi gures like Sherlock Holmes and mythical objects like Vulcan.
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effects. For example, force, macro-objects like Earth and human be-
ings, micro-objects including atoms and other basic particles, are relat-
ed together and have mutual effects; thus we admit the reality of force 
and atoms. So, in my opinion, “the actual” include both concrete objects 
like physical individuals, and at least some parasitic objects, such as 
properties, relations, classes, and laws. Moreover, I call fi ctional and 
intensional objects “ideal objects”, existing in humans’ epistemic sys-
tem articulated by language. Ideal objects can be shared by different 
people, and occur as the products of human intellect. In addition, there 
are delicate relations between ideal existence and actual existence. In 
some sense, ideal objects are the reconstruction of actual objects by cog-
nitive subjects in a variety of ways. Even for the queerest and strangest 
creations of human thinking, we can still discern the shadows of actual 
objects on them. As Popper emphasizes, once ideal objects are created 
by people, they usually transcend their producers and get their own 
independent lives.
* * *
I support Russell’s view that a logical and semantic theory may be 
tested by “its capacity for dealing with puzzles” (Russell 1905: 484). 
So, in order to test the effectiveness of my SHCD, we can examine how 
it reply to Kripke’s arguments against descriptivism, including the 
epistemic, the semantic and the modal, and other logical puzzles about 
names, e.g. the puzzle about belief presented by Kripke (1979), and 
what differences there are between my SHCD and other versions of 
descriptivism, and between SHCD and referentialism in dealing with 
these matters. However, all these tasks are far beyond the space-limit 
of this paper, and also some of them have been done in my other pub-
lished papers (Chen Bo 2011, 2012, 2013a, 2013b, 2015), at whom some 
reader, if interested, may have a look.
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